Can My Employer Fire Me for a Disability It Did Not Know About in California?

Twenty Months Without Incident, Then Two Days That Changed Everything

Daniel Husband was hired by Target Corporation in October 2020 as a fulfillment expert at a store in Burbank. For the first 20 months of his employment, he had no negative incidents. He had been diagnosed with bipolar I disorder, but he did not disclose that diagnosis to Target — not during orientation, not at any time during his employment, and not at the time of any of the incidents described below.

In early July 2022, that changed. Over two consecutive shifts, Husband displayed conduct that Target supervisors described as "out of the ordinary," "disturbing," "irrational," and "erratic." He told a supervisor that his fulfillment work orders were "laughing at him." He pointed fingers and yelled at a coworker. The next night he arrived "shaky" and "distraught," told a supervisor he thought he had "killed" his stepmother by speaking a word, and asked whether he had killed anyone at the store. A supervisor sent him home with a recommendation that he see a doctor or mental health professional.

Husband and his father returned to the store later that night and again the following morning. Target managers explained that the conduct had frightened other employees. The day after the second incident, Target's store director, HR lead, and district HR business partner made the decision to terminate Husband for violating the company's workplace violence policy. At the time the decision was made, Husband had not informed Target of his bipolar disorder.

The day after the termination decision (but before Husband was informed of it), Husband arrived barefoot at the store, entered an employee-only area, grabbed a set of security keys, ran out of the store, claimed to be someone else, threw the keys at an employee, and began to disrobe before walking away. The incident was captured on security cameras.

About a week later, Husband submitted a medical note saying he had been "evaluated and deemed able to return to work." The note did not disclose any diagnosis. Target informed him that same day he had been terminated. Later, through counsel, Husband demanded reinstatement on the ground that his termination had been disability discrimination. Target did not respond. Husband then sued for FEHA disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process. The trial court granted summary judgment for Target. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

Two Different FEHA Knowledge Standards

The Court of Appeal explained that California's Fair Employment and Housing Act conditions all three of Husband's claims on the employer's knowledge of the disability. Without that knowledge, none of the claims can succeed. And the FEHA actually applies two different knowledge standards, one for each kind of claim:

For disability discrimination claims: When an employee has not disclosed a disability to the employer, the employer's knowledge will be inferred "only when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts." If there is any other reasonable interpretation of what the employer observed, the inference of knowledge does not apply.

For failure-to-accommodate and interactive-process claims: The employer's knowledge will be inferred only if the disability is "obvious," or if its observed symptoms are "so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability" that the existence of a disability "always follows" from the observed symptoms.

Both standards are demanding. Both require something very close to certainty about the nature of the disability before the law will charge the employer with knowledge of a condition the employee never disclosed.

Why Target Did Not Meet Either Standard

The Court of Appeal held that Husband's conduct on July 7 and 8, 2022 — although unmistakably disturbing — did not meet either knowledge standard. The court reasoned that the same erratic behavior could have multiple alternative explanations: it could have been a manifestation of bipolar disorder, but it could equally have been the result of substance use, sleep deprivation, medication side effects, an acute stress reaction, or other causes. Because more than one reasonable interpretation existed, bipolar disorder was not the "only" reasonable interpretation — and the observed symptoms were not "so obviously manifestations" of bipolar disorder that the disability "always follows."

The court also addressed Husband's argument that he himself had not been consciously aware of his manic episodes at the time, and therefore could not have disclosed what he did not know. The court rejected this as an equitable argument. The legal standard depends on what the employer knew, not on whether the employee was capable of disclosure. An employee's good-faith inability to recognize his own symptoms does not lower the employer's knowledge threshold.

The court also noted, somewhat poignantly, that several Target employees testified they would have accommodated Husband had he told them about his condition. That fact did not change the legal analysis — but it underscored that the case turned on the absence of disclosure, not on Target's willingness or unwillingness to comply with FEHA if it had been informed.

What Husband Decides — and What It Does Not

It is important to be precise about what Husband holds. The opinion does not say that employees with mental health disabilities cannot bring FEHA claims. It does not say that bipolar disorder, or any other mental health condition, is unprotected. It does not say that Target's termination decision was wise or compassionate. What it says is that under FEHA, employer liability requires employer knowledge — and the legal standard for charging an employer with constructive knowledge of an undisclosed disability is exceptionally high.

The decision also reaffirms two longstanding doctrines that frequently affect disability cases:

The "only reasonable interpretation" standard for discrimination claims. When an employee has not disclosed a disability, the employer's knowledge of the disability cannot be inferred from observed behavior unless that behavior admits of no other reasonable explanation. Almost any erratic conduct in the workplace admits of multiple reasonable explanations — substance use, sleep, stress, medical side effects, personal crisis. The bar is therefore very rarely met without disclosure.

The "always follows" standard for accommodation and interactive-process claims. Even where the conduct strongly suggests a disability, the employer's duty to accommodate or engage in the interactive process only arises when the observed symptoms are so unmistakably tied to a specific disability that the disability "always follows" from those symptoms. This standard, articulated in cases like Soria v. Univision Radio and Pensinger v. Bowsmith, has consistently been applied narrowly by California courts.

What Husband ultimately reinforces is that disclosure is the mechanism that activates FEHA's protections. The substantive protections exist. The accommodation duty exists. The interactive-process duty exists. But for employees whose disabilities are not disclosed and whose symptoms do not unmistakably announce a specific condition, those protections often cannot do their work.

What This Means for California Employees with Mental Health and Invisible Disabilities

For California employees with mental health conditions, chronic illnesses, or other "invisible" disabilities, the practical implications of Husband are sobering but actionable. The case does not change the substantive law of disability discrimination. It clarifies the procedural reality of what happens when disclosure has not occurred.

Several lessons follow:

• Timely disclosure is the single most protective step an employee with a mental health or invisible disability can take. Even a general disclosure ("I have a medical condition that may sometimes affect my behavior — I want to make sure my supervisor knows in case I need accommodation") puts the employer on actual notice and triggers FEHA's protections. The disclosure does not require naming a specific diagnosis.
• Documentation matters. Disclosures should ideally be in writing, or at least confirmed in writing after a verbal conversation. A vague after-the-fact memory of "I think I told my supervisor" is much weaker evidence than an email or written note.
• Erratic behavior is not enough to put an employer on legal notice. No matter how disturbing the conduct, courts will generally not infer that an employer "knew" about a mental health disability unless that disability is the only reasonable interpretation of what was observed. Most conduct admits of multiple interpretations.
• An employee's good-faith inability to recognize their own symptoms does not lower the employer's knowledge threshold. This is hard, particularly for conditions involving episodes the employee may not perceive accurately in real time. But the law is what it is, and the protective move is to establish the disability with the employer before such episodes occur — not after.
• The disclosure conversation should ideally happen when things are going well, not in the middle of a crisis. Disclosure made during a calm period is easier, less stigmatized, and provides a clean record. Disclosure made in the middle of an episode is harder for both sides and is more likely to be contested later.

The harder lesson is that California's substantive disability protections, broad and meaningful as they are, depend on the employer being placed on notice in a way the law recognizes. For employees who have not yet disclosed but may eventually need accommodation, the time to think this through is before something goes wrong.